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The European Forum was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 1992 with 
the mission of bringing together at the Institute for a  given academic year a 
group of experts, under the supervision of annual scientific director(s), for 
researching a specific topic primarily of a comparative and interdisciplinary 
nature. 
 
This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 2000-2001 European 
Forum programme on “Between Europe and the Nation State: the Reshaping of 
Interests, Identities and Political Representation” directed by Professors Stefano 
Bartolini (EUI, SPS Department), Thomas Risse (EUI, RSC/SPS Joint Chair) 
and Bo Stråth (EUI, RSC/HEC Joint Chair). 
 
The Forum reflects on the domestic impact of European integration, studying the 
extent to which  Europeanisation shapes the adaptation patterns, power 
redistribution, and shifting loyalties at the national level. The categories of 
‘interest’ and ‘identity’ are at the core of the programme and a particular 
emphasis is given to the formation of new social identities, the redefinition of 
corporate interests, and the domestic changes in the forms of political 
representation. 
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Human reproduction has long been a site of contestation in moral, religious and 
political debate. In particular, finding ways to promote or to prevent conception 
and pregnancy has occupied many sectors of society including the church, the 
medical profession, women’s groups and, of course, the institutions of the state. 
The development of the oral contraceptive pill and more liberal access to 
abortion in the 1960s heralded a ‘sexual revolution’ and increased individual 
control over reproductive matters, especially for women who sought to avoid 
pregnancy and motherhood. Having thus established ways to avoid 
reproduction, the 1980s saw a different kind of ‘reproductive revolution’, one 
that promoted procreation by furthering the possibilities of assisted conception 
for those seeking non-traditional ways to reproduce using developments in 
medical technologies such as donor insemination and in vitro fertilisation (IVF). 
This is seen particularly in the context of same-sex relationships with the 
phenomenon of the ‘gay family’ being highly contested. The 1990s brought 
wider dissemination and availability of new reproductive technologies, together 
with their further development (such as, for example, the advent of cloning 
techniques) and have seen an extension of these procedures into more people’s 
lives lifting the debate on human reproduction to a new level both in terms of 
the generality and the breadth of the application of the new technologies. The 
reproductive revolution has evidently not been short-lived and, furthermore, is 
not yet complete, for it seems that scarcely a week passes but that one reads of a 
new development and a new stage being reached in our reproductive histories.  
 
Increased choice in reproductive matters, however, comes at a price. As 
the outer limits of reproductive possibilities are ever extended, choice may 
swiftly evolve into pressure to reproduce, a sense of failure on the part of those 
who do not succeed, and social exclusion of those who wish to remain child-
free. Choice may also become coercive if it leads to the commercialisation of 
body parts that take on increased value in the reproductive market. For example, 
women may face financial pressures that induce them to engage in egg donation 
or surrogacy arrangements. Increased choice also makes more likely 
disagreements between those seeking to maximise or minimise use of the new 
reproductive opportunities on offer. Inevitably conflicts will arise between the 
varied interests of the protagonists of the sexual and reproductive revolutions: 
between women seeking terminations and putative fathers, or between these 
same women and their foetuses. One can also imagine disputes materialising 
between would-be parents and doctors, health authorities and gametes donors, 
                                                                 
* For their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper my thanks go to 
Gráinne de Búrca, Bruno de Witte, Elizabeth Kingdom, Sally Sheldon, Neil Walker, Noel 
Whitty and the participants in the European Forum seminar programme 2000-01.  
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and more generally between the interests of human beings and embryos created 
via the new technologies.  
 
It is with the resolution of these conflicts in mind that this paper focuses 
on one particular aspect of the reproductive revolution  – the question of the 
rights of the protagonists. More specifically still it is their legal - as opposed to 
moral – rights that are under the spotlight. Of course, to talk of legal rights does 
not exclude from the parameters of debate questions about the moral and 
political choices involved in the enforcement of those rights. The complex 
interrelationship between law and morality has long exercised the minds of 
scholars as exemplified in the infamous debate which took place in the 1960s 
between HLA Hart and Lord Devlin upon the question of whether or not some 
issues should be quite simply not the law’s business.
1 Despite the desirability 
that areas of life (particularly one’s private life), should be beyond law’s reach, 
the idea that law can exist in isolation from questions of morality is simply 
untenable as it is evident that law does not operate in a vacuum and that 
consideration of the political and social contexts in which legal rights are 
exercised cannot be excluded when determining their enforceability. That said, 
the focus of this article upon  legal rights is justified not only because of their 
normative function in prescribing certain modes of behaviour, but also because 




Questions about the legal rights of those involved in issues of human 
reproduction are, of course, vast and wide-ranging  – including issues of 
entitlement to services a nd treatments, the legal status of mothers and fathers, 
access to information, authorisation to pursue research and experimentation 
upon embryos and so on. In order to narrow the subject matter somewhat, the 
particular focus of this article is upon the human rights, or fundamental rights, of 
those involved. Thus the paper situates its discussion of reproductive rights 
within the context of contemporary human rights discourses. In particular, it 
looks at the new mechanisms for human rights protection in the UK since the 
adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), whose unprecedented legal and 
political significance has led to talk of a ‘rights revolution’.
3 Discussion is 
situated, therefore, at the point of confrontation between the reproductive 
                                                                 
1 P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (OUP, 1968); H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 
(OUP, 1968). 
2 Discussion of the broader questions surrounding the political morality of rights discourse 
and the inter-relationship between rights and democracy is beyond the scope of this paper 
which is predominantly strategic in nature. A useful contextualisation of reproductive matters 
within these wider themes can be found in R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion - An Argument about 
Abortion and Euthanasia (Harper Collins, 1993).  
3 C. Harvey, ‘Governing after the Rights Revolution’ (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 
61.   
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revolution a nd the more recent rights revolution. Moreover, the subject is 
approached from a gendered perspective - that is one which conceives of gender 
as a central organising principle of social life.
4 Such a perspective aims to reveal 
the power relationships which are inherent within social relations and is 
premised upon a commitment to progressive social change. From this 
standpoint, with its present emphasis upon the gendered nature of  legal 
relationships,
5 particular consideration will be given to the implications and 
effects of the HRA upon the UK’s legal culture (that is the legal environment, 
techniques of legal argumentation and litigation practices and strategies) given 
that, for the first time in our constitutional history, this Act incorporates the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter the Convention) into 
domestic law, permitting litigants to rely on the human rights guarantees 
provided under the Convention before national (as opposed to a European) 
court(s).  
 
It is to be recognised that this scenario presents a distinct problem 
peculiar to the United Kingdom. There has been no need for a similar ‘rights 
revolution’ elsewhere in Western Europe given that, with the exception of 
Ireland, other states signatory to the Convention have incorporated it into their 
legal systems.
6  So, for example, in France and the Netherlands the monist 
approach to international law means that national courts have for many years 
been used to applying international legal texts which protect fundamental rights 
(such as the Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
                                                                 
4 See generally, M. Humm,  Feminisms: A Reader  (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992); A.M. 
Jagger,  Feminist Politics and Human Nature  (Harvester, 1983); S. Kemp and J. Squires, 
Feminisms (OUP, 1997); R. Tong, Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction (Unwin 
Hyam, 1989). 
5 On the relationship between law and gender see, for example, A. Bottomley (ed.), Feminist 
Perspectives on the Foundational Subjects of Law (Cavendish Publishing, 1996); A. 
Bottomley and J. Conaghan (eds.), Feminist Theory and Legal Strategy (Blackwell, 1993); J. 
Bridgeman and S. Millns, Feminist Perspectives on Law: Law’s Engagement with the Female 
Body (Sweet and Maxwell, 1998); R. Greycar and J. Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law 
(The Federation Press, 1990); N. Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and 
Social Theory  (Hart Publishing, 1998); C.A. MacKinnon,  Feminism Unmodified  (Harvard 
University Press, 1987); N. Naffine,  Law and the Sexes  (Allen & Unwin, 1990); K. 
O’Donovan,  Sexual Divisions in Law  (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985); A. Sachs and J.H. 
Wilson,  Sexism and the Law: A Study of Male Beliefs and Legal Bias in Britain and the 
United States  (Martin Robertson, 1978); C. Smart,  Feminism and the Power of Law 
(Routledge, 1989).   
6 This does not, h owever, render the Irish situation analagous to that in the UK because there 
exists, nevertheless, in Ireland a strong tradition of rights protection based upon the judicial 
development of the rights guaranteed in the Irish Constitution. For discussion of  national 
approaches to the Convention see the country specific studies in C.A. Gearty (ed.), European 
Civil Liberties and the European Convention on Human Rights: A Comparative Study 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1997).    
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Rights) in order to disapply national legislative provisions in cases of conflict.
7 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Courts of other countries, such as Germany and 
Italy, have developed an active national system of rights protection through 
interpretations of the extensive rights provisions contained in their own 
Constitutions. This has meant that international texts such as the Convention 
have had relatively little impact given that the protection of rights under national 
law is already considered more extensive than that under international law.   
 
Questions of the interpretation of reproductive rights in other Western 
European countries have, hence, been dealt with according to these various 
mechanisms for rights protection. Thus, in France, for example, the  Conseil 
d'Etat has ruled that the 1975 law on abortion is indeed compatible with the 
European Convention on Human Rights,
8 while in Germany, the Constitutional 
Court has examined the compatibility of domestic legislation on abortion with 
fundamental rights protected under the German Constitution.
9 While, therefore, 
the reproductive revolution may be a common phenomenon throughout Western 
Europe, its occurrence in conjunction with a ‘rights revolution’ is very particular 
to the UK context.   
  
Bearing this particularity in mind, the first section of the paper introduces 
the new regime for the protection of fundamental rights under the HRA and sets 
this within contemporary human rights discourses. Two themes are then 
advanced concerning the role of two sets of actors in the rights debate. The first 
theme centres upon litigants themselves and addresses the question of the utility 
of pursuing rights-based strategies (as opposed to other legal and non-legal 
options) within the new system of rights protection. This question is important 
especially with regard to the situation of minority groups and those who 
conventionally lack power in society. For example, scepticism has been 
expressed by feminists such as Elizabeth Kingdom and Carol Smart over the 
desirability of using rights-based arguments to advance women’s position in 
society given that such arguments may promise more in theory than they can 
deliver in practice.
10 How likely, therefore, is it  that the rights revolution will 
make such scepticism now obsolete? The second theme is concerned with 
another set of empowered, rising stars of the rights revolution  - the national 
judiciary. Under scrutiny will be their enhanced role after incorporation of the 
Convention which will require of them a shift in traditional ways of articulating 
questions of human rights protection and will demand unprecedented 
                                                                 
7 French Constitution, Article 55; Dutch Constitution, Article 94. 
8 Conseil d'Etat 21 December 1990, D. 1991, 283. 
9 Abortion I Case (1975) 39 BVerfGE I; Abortion II Case (1993) 88 BVerfGE 203. 
10 E. Kingdom, What’s Wrong with Rights: Problems for Feminist Politics of Law (Edinburgh 
University Press, 1991); C. Smart, ibid..  
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involvement at national level in balancing the disparate interests of those 
asserting their rights under the Convention.  
 
This initial introduction to the new human rights culture in the UK is 
followed by a second section which considers the ways in which reproductive 
rights may be litigated currently under the Convention and under domestic law 
and how this might change under the new human rights regime. In particular the 
provisions of national legislation, such as the Abortion Act 1967 and the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, are investigated in order to uncover the 
measure of their (in)compatibility with the rights guaranteed under the 
Convention. The example of reproductive rights used here to highlight tensions 
between Europe and the nation state is particularly illuminating in that 
reproduction is at once both a  universal concern and one w hich in its 
operationalisation, that is its facilitation or prevention, raises questions that are 
intimately connected to  national visions of concepts such as the family, 
motherhood and marriage, not to mention country specific moral values and 
concerns. T he section will highlight the problematic interaction between 
domestic law and Convention rights and pinpoint areas which might spark 
litigation. 
 
 I BRINGING RIGHTS HOME – THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 AND 
THE NEW RIGHTS CULTURE  
 
In order to place the question of reproductive rights in context, it is first 
necessary to take a brief look at the prevailing climate of rights protection in the 
UK. This has undergone important changes associated with the constitutional 
reform programme of the new Labour government following its election victory 
in 1997.
11 One key aspect of the programme has been ‘Bringing Rights Home’ - 
the government’s response to the long-standing debate over whether or not a Bill 
of Rights should be introduced in the UK and if so what form it should take.
12 
As outlined above, this project, introducing one of the most radical reforms to 
human rights law that the UK has known, involves the ‘domestication’ of human 
rights via the incorporation into national law of the European Convention on 
                                                                 
11 In its first parliamentary session the government introduced eleven new constitutional Bills 
(six on devolution, one on the EU, two on electoral reform, one on elected mayors and one on 
human rights). These reforms are neatly reviewed in R. Hazell, ‘Reinventing the Constitution: 
Can the State Survive?’ [1999] Public Law 84.   
12  Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm 3782, 1997. Literature on the 
desirability or otherwise of a Bill of Rights in the UK is abundant. See, for example, Institute 
of Public Policy Research, The Constitution of the United Kingdom (IPPR, 1991); A. Lester, 
‘Fundamental Rights: The United Kingdom Isolated’ [1984]  Public Law  46; Liberty,  A 
People's Charter: Liberty's Bill of Rights  (Liberty, 1991); J.  Wadham, ‘Bringing Rights 
Home: Labour's Plans to Incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into UK 
Law’ [1997] Public Law 75; M. Zander, A Bill of Rights 4
th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997).   
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Human Rights.
13 In order to protect national sovereignty no such implementing 
measure had been taken before, despite the fact that the UK had been a 
significant contributor to the drafting process of the Convention and in 1951 was 
one of the first states to ratify it. Given the supremacy of the UK parliament, and 
hence of domestic law, the Convention was only ever applicable as part of 
international law. Consequently victims alleging violations of their Convention 
rights had to take their claims to the European Commission and Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg in order for them to be heard – a lengthy and costly process 
(although it might be noted in passing that, while in the past claims of alleged 
violations of rights under the Convention had to be made first of all to the 
Commission which would then screen them for admissibility and take an initial 
decision upon their merits, with the coming into force of Protocol 11 to the 
Convention on 1 November 1998, applications may now be made directly to the 
Court with the expectation that this will speed up the time taken to render 
decisions).
14 In the domestic context, however, while the UK judiciary has 
always been under a duty to do its best to interpret national law in the light of 
Convention rights, in cases of clear conflict between UK law and the 
Convention, national law would prevail.
15  
 
1. THE MECHANICS OF THE NEW REGIME 
 
The ‘rights revolution’ has introduced a number of important changes to the old 
regime. As of October 2000, when the HRA came into force in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland (having already been made partially effective in Scotland 
since May 1999), the substantive rights under the Convention may be invoked 
by individuals before the UK courts (although a number of procedural rights and 
the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 remain, controversially, 
unincorporated). For litigants this process has the advantage of speed and cost 
efficiency in the resolution of rights claims, but it is also a form of 
empowerment for the national judiciary in that it devolves upon them a new 
responsibility to give effect to Convention rights and represents an opportunity 
for them to reassert a domestic interpretation of rights (another important aspect 
of the project to ‘bring rights home’). But, unlike many constitutional courts in 
                                                                 
13 For further detail on the operation of the HRA see K.D.  Ewing, ‘The Human Rights Act 
and Parliamentary Democracy’ (1998) 62 Modern Law Review 79; D. Feldman, ‘The Human 
Rights Act 1998 and Constitutional Principles’ (1999) 19  Legal Studies  165; F. Klug, ‘The 
Human Rights Act 1998, Pepper v. Hart and All That’ [1999] Public Law 246; J. Wadham 
and H. Mountfield,  Blackstone's Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998  (Blackstone Press, 
1999).  
14 A.R. Mowbray, ‘The Composition and Operation of the New European Court of Human 
Rights’ [1999] Public Law 219. 
15 On the enforcement of rights in the domestic context see M. Hunt, Using Human Rights 
Law in English Courts  (Hart Publishing, 1998) and comment thereon in N. Walker, ‘Setting 
English Judges to Rights’ (1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 133.   
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other jurisdictions, the new power of the judiciary does not extend to striking 
down primary legislation judged to be incompatible with Convention rights. In 
this respect parliamentary sovereignty is maintained. Instead, some courts (the 
High Court and above) may issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ signifying a 
finding of a legislative breach of the Convention which may then be rectified by 
a ‘fast-track’ procedure whereby the appropriate government minister can issue 
an Order to a mend the offending legislation subject to the approval of both 
houses of parliament.  A finding, therefore, that the Abortion Act 1967 or the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, for example, contain provisions 
contrary to the rights guaranteed under the Convention might result in a swift 
amendment to these statutes short-cutting the normally extensive parliamentary 
debate in these controversial matters.  
 
A further limitation of the HRA is with respect to the types of executive 
actions which can be reviewed for their compatibility with rights under the 
Convention. The Act has only ‘vertical’ effect which means that it is only acts of 
public authorities that are subject to review by the courts for their Convention 
compliance. The provisions of the Act are not ‘horizontally’ effective meaning 
that the courts have no power to review the actions of private individuals, even 
if they appear to infringe rights guaranteed by the Convention, the only 
exception being where a private body can be said to be performing a ‘public’ 
function. So, for example, while the decision of a public health authority not to 
allow a woman access to new reproductive technologies might be scrutinised for 
its compatibility with that woman’s fundamental rights, a similar decision of a 
private clinic would not be unless it could be established that the clinic (being 
regulated under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 in its 
provision of IVF services) was performing a public function and thus fell within 
the terms of the HRA. This situation might well introduce inequalities between 
individuals in the enforcement of their rights claims depending upon the 




That said, there is an important way in which this limitation may not be as 
restrictive as it initially appears. This is because the HRA imposes a further, and 
more general, duty of interpretation upon the judiciary who are obliged to 
interpret  all legislation as far as possible to be in conformity with Convention 
                                                                 
16 It is evident that the very definition of what constitutes a ‘public authority’ and ‘functions 
of a public nature’ under s.6 of the HRA is contested terrain and capable of either a broad or a 
narrow construction. The consequences of giving broad or narrow meanings to these phrases 
are discussed in D. Oliver, ‘The Frontiers of the State: Public Authorities and Public 
Functions under the Human Rights Act’ [2000] Public Law 476.   
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rights.
17 Hence, the actions of private individuals will be subjected to 
interpretation through the lens of Convention rights when questions over the 
meaning of any legislation are raised.
18 This may be of particular relevance in 
the sphere of reproductive rights given their often private nature arising within 
the context of intimate human relationships and ostensibly, therefore, beyond the 
reach of the state. Furthermore, in carrying out this interpretative exercise, the 
judges are required to have regard to the existing body of decisions and case law 
of the Strasbourg institutions. It is, therefore, of importance to investigate the 
way in which reproductive rights have been interpreted by these institutions as 
this is bound to be influential upon any disputes brought before the UK courts.
19 
We will return to this question below.  
 
2. THE CHANGING CULTURE OF RIGHTS   
 
The HRA has, therefore, brought about substantial shifts in the legal 
mechanisms in place for human r ights protection in the UK. Beyond the 
procedures themselves, however, broader questions may be identified 
concerning the shift in legal culture which the operation of the HRA will 
require.
20 Primarily, it is clear that the behaviour of individual litigants and the 
legal strategies adopted by lawyers and the judiciary demand adaptation to the 
new culture of rights protection. This is particularly so given that the HRA 
marks a shift away from the traditional approach to rights protection in the UK, 
which has  been largely negative in its formulation (one is permitted to do 
anything which the law does not prohibit) towards an emphasis on the protection 
of rights framed in a positive fashion (for example, the entitlement to a right to 
                                                                 
17 F. Bennion, ‘What Interpretation is "Possible" under Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 
1998?’ [2000] Public Law 77. 
18 See further M. Hunt, ‘The "Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act’ [1998] Public Law 
423. 
19 Convention jurisprudence on reproductive rights represents only one facet of the European 
Commission and Court's discussion of issues that  feature a gender dimension. As such it can 
be viewed more broadly within the context of discussion by the Strasbourg organs of other 
matters such as the family and marital status (Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330, Keegan 
v Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342); homosexuality (Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 
149, Norris v Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186, Modinos v Cyprus (1993) 16 EHRR 485, Laskey, 
Jaggard and Brown  v  United Kingdom  (1997) 24 EHRR 39, Smith and Grady v  United 
Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 493); transsexuality (Rees v United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 56, 
Cossey v  United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 622, B v France (1993) 16 EHRR 1, Sheffield 
and Horsham v  United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 163; sexual violence ( X and Y  v  The 
Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235, SW v United Kingdom and CR v United Kingdom (1995) 21 
EHRR 363); and immigration (Abdulaziz, Cebales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985) 
7 EHRR 471).    
20 See further L. Clements and J. Young ‘Human Rights: Changing the Culture’ (1999) 26 
Journal of Law and Society 1; M. Hunt, ‘The Human Rights Act and Legal Culture: The 
Judiciary and the Legal Profession’ (1999) 26 Journal of Law and Society 86.  
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life, a right to respect for private life, to freedom of expression and so on). It is 
hardly surprising that experience in Scotland, where the HRA was binding upon 
the Scottish Executive for 18 months prior to its full implementation in the rest 
of the UK, suggests a rather mixed and messy beginning in adapting to the 
demands of the new rights culture.
21   
 
Nevertheless, as far as individual litigants are concerned the new regime 
might appear attractive in that it offers increased possibilities for the 
enforcement of their individual rights and freedoms and a new legal strategy to 
pursue before the courts. However, this new possibility needs to be viewed with 
a degree of caution. In the past a number of problems have been identified when 
individuals have sought to base claims upon an assertion of their legal rights and 
the question, therefore, needs to be asked as to whether the HRA might not just 
simply exacerbate these difficulties.  
 
A preliminary difficulty may be identified in the way that human rights 
tend to be understood in terms of individual rights. While on the one hand such a 
construction is helpful in ensuring that rights are seen to pertain to each and 
every human being, it can, nevertheless, be a hindrance to the progressive 
construction of group and collective rights, particularly those of minorities. The 
violation of individual rights demands an individual initiative in enforcing that 
right and results in an individual remedy should an interference be found. 
Individual rights are, therefore, not necessarily the best way to tackle pervasive 
and systemic discrimination against particular sectors of society.    
 
Furthermore, a distinction can be drawn between the formal acquisition of 
a right and its capacity to realise change in practice. For example, historically, 
while individuals who have suffered discrimination have initially sought to 
combat this through claims for a right to legal equality, it has subsequently 
become apparent that such claims, even though they may result in anti-
discrimination measures being enacted and hence the acquisition of formal legal 
rights, may not ultimately produce a more substantive form of equality. Hence, 
in the area of sex equality, despite the enactment of the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975, discrimination against women in many spheres of life still persists both in 
those areas covered by this legislation (employment, education and the receipt of 
services) and also beyond its sphere of operation.
22 It is apparent, therefore, that 
                                                                 
21 It is, primarily, aspects of the Scottish criminal justice system which have been declared 
contrary to fundamental rights. See A. Loux and W. Finnie (eds.), Human Rights and Scots 
Law – Comparative Perspectives on the Incorporation of the ECHR (Hart Publishing, 2000).  
22 For discussion in the area of employment law, see A. Morris and S. Nott, Working Women 
and the Law: Equality and Discrimination in Theory and Practice (Routledge, 1991). For 
more general discussion on the difference between formal and substantive equality see J. 
Bridgeman and S. Millns, supra, n.4, ch.2.  
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calls for the enforcement of greater legal rights which, even when successful, 
result in the failure to confer concrete gains may simply act as a decoy, 
detracting from the substance of a particular problem and providing an excuse 
for no further action on the part of public authorities. In the area of abortion and 
fertility treatment services, particularly, it may be of little worth to those seeking 
access to these provisions whether or not they have a formally protected legal 
right to do so if ultimately the state refuses to fund the services, making access 
impossible for those lacking the financial resources to fund the treatments 
themselves. This situation is well illustrated in the United States of America 
where the decriminalisation of abortion founded upon the constitutional right to 
privacy, has not prevented the Supreme Court from finding that this right does 
not mean that abortions need be funded by federal Medicaid programmes 
(Harris v. McRae (1980) 448 US 297).  The constitutionally protected right to 
privacy and a woman’s ability to ‘choose’ a termination, therefore, are only 
guaranteed in so far as she is able to pay for the service herself.  
 
Another danger for some litigants when entering into the new rights 
discourse is the fact that rights provisions inevitably cut both ways. That is to 
say claims for legal  rights made by one litigant may produce counter-claims on 
behalf of another  – claims which will probably run in direct opposition to one 
another. Hence, the rights of the various protagonists of the reproductive 
revolution may clash and, as will be seen below, this can lead to tussles in court 
over the meaning and interpretation of the various rights and interests involved. 
Thus, as rights claims proliferate, it may be that certain individuals are required 
to become more  defensive as opposed to offensive in their litigation strategies 
simply in order to maintain the status quo and any already acquired legal rights. 
In the area of reproductive rights, for example, Stephanie Palmer has highlighted 
the difficulties for pro-choice activists who, in the face of an assertion of rights 
claims by the anti-choice movement, may have to retrench simply in order to 
defend in court the democratically acquired rights which women currently have 
to seek abortion services in the UK.
23 The effect of adopting this defensive 
position would be to limit the resources available to push for increased access 
and would ultimately impede the pursuit of the more far-reaching goal of 
securing a right for women to choose freely whether or not to terminate a 
pregnancy. 
 
                                                                 
23 S. Palmer, ‘Critical Perspectives on Women’s Rights: T he European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ in A. Bottomley (ed.),  Feminist Perspectives on the 
Foundational Subjects of Law (Cavendish Publishing, 1996) p.223, at p.239. Similar concerns 
have been raised about the way in which Convention rights might be used by defendants in 
cases of sexual assault to undermine the position of their alleged victims: T. Murphy and N. 
Whitty, ‘What is a Fair Trial? Rape Prosecutions, Disclosure and the Human Rights Act’ 
(2000) 8 Feminist Legal Studies 143.   
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A further difficulty  is created for litigants by the very nature of the 
Convention itself. It protects in the main only civil and political rights and is 
short on social and economic rights which have, furthermore, been largely 
excluded from the whole debate on reform.
24 In the area of reproduction, 
however, the application of social rights in particular might well be a more 
pertinent way to approach the subject matter. For example, a right to adequate 
health care does not feature among the rights under the Convention. Rights 
claims made under the new regime might, therefore, lead to a skewing of the 
real issue in order to ‘fit’ the prescribed rights agenda on offer.  
 
Yet, despite these evident difficulties with the new human rights regime, 
it must not be forgotten that the call to rights can be empowering for individuals. 
It allows claimants to access the new legal rights culture by putting them at 
centre stage and gives litigants a new string to their bow of legal strategies. To 
this extent the new rights culture provides an important space in which new 
ways of thinking about human rights law can be advanced and will certainly 
give voice to individual rights claims which may not have surfaced under the old 
regime. Furthermore, given the overwhelming climate change in favour of rights 
discourse in the UK political context, it is apparent that engagement with this 
discourse is ineluctable and, as such, its opportunities need to be explored as 
fully as possible by would-be litigants.
25 Proceeding with a degree of caution, 
therefore, litigants may have much to gain from the new climate of human rights 
protection. 
 
The need to proceed with caution might also be sound advice with regard 
to a second set of protagonists in the rights revolution  – the judiciary  – with 
whom much of the operation of the HRA now rests. Remembering, however, 
that the judges have been schooled, and are used to working, within a tradition 
of common law which has focussed upon providing  remedies as opposed to 
granting rights, they too, like the litigants before them, will be required to make 
changes in their ways of thinking about rights claims within the new human 
rights culture.  
 
                                                                 
24 See K.D. Ewing, ‘Social Rights and Constitutional Law’ [1999] Public Law 104. 
25 The ‘ineluctability’ of rights discourse is advanced by Elizabeth Kingdom as one strategic 
reason for feminists to engage in this discourse; the other two grounds being the ‘re-assertion’ 
of rights discourse where its limitations are judged less important than its political 
effectiveness, and the ‘conversion strategy’ according to which conventional ‘women’s 
rights’ can be converted into rights which more effectively improve women’s position: E. 
Kingdom, ‘Body Politics and Rights’ in J. Bridgeman and S. Millns (eds.),  Law and Body 
Politics: Regulating the Female Body (Dartmouth, 1995) p.1, at pp.10-18.    
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First, and perhaps most obviously, it must not be forgotten that the 
enforcement of rights before the courts does not operate in isolation of the 
context in which those rights are sought. While much scholarship recognises that 
human rights reform is a key aspect of the constitutional reform programme, 
debate both in practice and in the academy has, nevertheless, tended to take 
place at a  rather abstract level concentrating on internal analyses of competing 
rights provisions and paying little attention to the contexts in which human 
rights law operates and the external impact of judicial decision-making. The new 
regime requires much more i nsight to the extent that it is imperative that it 
reveal the power relations at the centre of all competing rights claims and that it 
does not ignore the ways in which the interpretation of fundamental rights will 
inevitably affect the lives of individual rights claimants and work towards the 
construction of the identities of particular groups within society, such as women, 
and sexual and ethnic minorities.
26   
 
The requirement of contextualisation does, of course, mean that the 
judiciary will not be able t o eschew the need to make difficult choices which 
have no easily identifiable legal solution and which in fact go to the very heart 
of moral and political decision-making. This is nowhere more evident than in 
the context of human reproduction with the ethical dilemmas it provokes. Yet, it 
may prove a challenge given the habitual way in which questions of 
reproduction have been steered by the UK judiciary away from the difficult 
terrain of reproductive politics and onto more ‘scientific’ or medical terrain. For 
example, in cases concerning abortion, Sally Sheldon has demonstrated that the 
judiciary, rather than pronouncing upon the individual rights claims of litigants, 
has preferred to conceptualise abortion disputes within a medical framework and 
thus to defer to medical authority with regard to the question of foetal viability 
in order to determine the legality or otherwise of a termination.
27 So, in a case 
where an 18 week old foetus was found not to be viable from a medical point of 
view a termination was  deemed legitimate ( C v  S [1987] 1 All ER 1230) and 
where a 27 week old foetus was deemed medically to be viable, a termination 
was judged to be unlawful (Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority [1991] 1 All 
ER 801). This deference to medical opinion has meant t hat judicial authorities 
are able to skirt around the thorny question of prioritising in a specific way the 
competing rights and interests of the pregnant woman, the foetus and the 
putative father. While, on the one hand it is debateable to what extent the escape 
route based upon medical expertise will remain open once the judiciary is forced 
to articulate its decisions within the context of competing claims based upon 
                                                                 
26 As demonstrated, for example, in the work of D. Herman, Rights of Passage: Struggles for 
Lesbian and Gay Equality (Toronto UP, 1994); and C. Stychin, A Nation by Rights: National 
Cultures, Sexual Identity Politics and the Discourse of Rights (Temple UP, 1998).  
27 S. Sheldon, ‘Subject Only to the Attitude of the Surgeon Concerned: The Judicial 
Protection of Medical Discretion’ (1996) 5 Social and Legal Studies 95.  
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positive legal rights, there may yet be other escape routes open. As will be seen 
below,  courts at the European level have also been fairly successful in 
developing alternative ways to characterise rights disputes in the sphere of 
reproduction, managing to slot them into frameworks which serve to obscure the 
politics behind those rights. It might be supposed that these alternative 
characterisations or formulations of rights disputes will influence national 
judicial decision-making too.  
 
The question of the context of human rights law, however, does raise an 
extremely important question about t he legitimacy of an increased judicial role 
in making decisions which are replete with moral and political overtones 
(notwithstanding the attempts – conscious or unconscious - of judges to disguise 
them). Aileen McColgan in her study of the impact of the HRA upon women’s 
rights expresses scepticism as to the democratic legitimacy of increased judicial 
intervention and fails to derive much comfort from the fact that parliamentary 
sovereignty is (at least theoretically) still preserved.
28 On the other hand Joanne 
Conaghan sees litigation strategies pursued before the courts (in the area of the 
development of the law of torts to encompass sexual harassment) as an 
important mechanism for judicial enterprise which can enhance the rights of 
minority groups who have otherwise found themselves marginalized, or 
unsuccessful, before the parliamentary process.
29 Whatever the rights or wrongs 
of increased judicial activity in assessing human rights claims it is worth bearing 
in mind that the judges themselves are a highly  selective group of individuals 
who tend to share similar traits and life experiences. One might, therefore, 
naturally be sceptical as to their ability to bring a plurality of perspectives to 
bear upon the matters brought before them. This point is particularly important 
for questions of reproductive rights which are often asserted by women and yet 
will continue to be determined by a still predominantly male judiciary.
30  
 
Having set out the stall of provisions under the HRA it is clear that the 
new human rights culture presents both troublesome and promising aspects. On 
balance a degree of cautious optimism as regards the Act’s potentially wide-
ranging application, together with vigilant scrutiny of the way in which it is 
applied in practice, would seem to be in order. Armed with an awareness of the 
risks entailed in any recourse to rights, a certain boldness on the part of litigants 
                                                                 
28 A. McColgan,  Women Under the Law: The False Promise of Human Rights (Pearson, 
2000). 
29 J. Conaghan, ‘Gendered Harms and the Law of Tort: Remedying (Sexual) Harassment’ 
(1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 407.  
30 For an assertion that women judges do make a difference to the legal process, see C. 
McGlynn, The Woman Lawyer: Making the Difference (Butterworths, 1998). On the influence 
of the composition and background of the judiciary upon decision-making, see J.A.G. 
Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Fontana Press, 1997).  
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and imagination on the part of legal advocates carries with it the definite 
possibility of the creation of a new and dynamic human rights policy across the 
breadth of the UK’s legal order. In the light of this assessment of more general 
concerns about the HRA, we will now turn to a detailed consideration of 
reproductive rights in particular. These will be investigated as they stand both 
under the Convention and under domestic law in order to identify points of 
tension between Convention rights and UK law. This is in an attempt to 
anticipate what might happen where there is confrontation between the two legal 
regimes and the new role played by the national judiciary begins to take effect.  
 
II REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, CONVENTION RIGHTS AND UK LAW 
 
The first important point to note within the sphere of reproductive rights is that 
neither UK law nor the Convention (nor indeed any international law), recognise 
a specific ‘right to reproduce’ nor conversely, do they recognise a ‘right not to 
reproduce’. Any rights which are, therefore, associated with the processes of 
reproduction, have to be pinned upon other legal provisions. Under the 
Convention this means hanging reproductive rights upon a number of the civil 
and political rights set out therein, the remit of which is necessarily rather broad 
and general. Within domestic UK law, conversely, the trend is more towards 
specificity with the articulation of reproductive rights and interests through the 
enactment of fairly detailed legislative provisions.  
 
Taking domestic law first, both the prevention of reproduction and the 
assistance of conception have been subjected to legal regulation at the national 
level  – the former more substantially and for a longer period of time than the 
latter. So, for example, legal aspects of the prevention of reproduction have led 
to measures regulating the provision in Great Britain of abortion (Abortion Act 
1967) and contraception (National Health Service Act 1977). More 
contemporaneously, controversy over surrogacy in the 1980s led to the swift 
passage of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, while the new wave of 
reproductive technologies, such as IVF and donor i nsemination, have been 
subjected to regulatory measures by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990.  
 
Under the Convention several different ways are identifiable in which 
reproductive matters may interrelate with the rights guaranteed, notably through 
an application of Article 2 (the right to life), Article 8 (the right to respect for 
private and family life), Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) 
Article 10 (freedom of expression), and Article 12 (the right to marry and found 
a family). Here, however, it is necessary to highlight an important feature of the 
rights under the Convention – and a factor which is not uniform amongst them – 
which is the way in which their enjoyment may be curtailed by the state in  
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certain situations. So, for example, while the right to life guaranteed under 
Article 2 is subject to few limitations (such as the use of lethal force in self 
defence), Articles 8, 9 and 10 permit the state to curtail the right to respect for 
private and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion and freedom 
of expression where this is necessary in a democratic society for a number of 
key reasons such as the protection of health or morals and the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. Article 12 may also be limited in its application 
by the national law of the signatory state. These limits, which are interpreted by 
the Strasbourg authorities to allow the state a broad ‘margin of appreciation’ 
(see Lawless v Ireland (1961) 1 EHRR 15 and Handyside v United Kingdom 
(1976) 1 EHRR 737), are not insignificant when viewed with respect to the 
diverse moral and ethical concerns, together with specific national interests, 
which may figure in reproductive choices and which must be managed and 
balanced. Also of potential relevance is Article 14 which prohibits 
discrimination upon a number of grounds including sex and any ‘other status’. 
However, this Article is not free-standing in that the guarantee which it contains 
cannot be pleaded on its own, but can only be raised in conjunction with the 
alleged violation of one of the substantive rights or freedoms set out in the 
Convention. This necessarily limits its utility in combating discrimination.
31 
 
1. CASE LAW UNDER THE CONVENTION    
 
It is necessary to consider the ways in which the above mentioned Articles have 
been interpreted by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights in 
reproductive matters as this case law will be called upon by the UK judiciary in 
actions brought before the national courts. Despite the absence of a specific right 
to reproduce, but given the diverse ways of advancing arguments about 
reproductive rights under the Convention, it is surprising that the case law in this 
area is relatively limited. The issue of abortion has provoked most discussion, 
but even this has often been raised in issues which can at first glance seem 
tangential to the construction of abortion as a matter of reproductive politics. 
Given, however, the significant margin of appreciation doctrine applied when 
balancing competing individual rights and state interests under the Convention, 
together with a distinct absence of consensus in the provision of abortion among 
parties to the Convention, the reluctance of the Commission and Court to 
intervene in such a sensitive area becomes easier to understand.  
 
                                                                 
31 Developments regarding the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe’s 
commitment to revise Article 14 by adopting Protocol no. 12 to the Convention (open for 
signature by member states on 4 November 2000) are summarised in G. Moon, ‘The Draft 
Discrimination Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights: A Progress Report’ 
[2000] European Human Rights Law Review 49. See further below, section II(2)(A)(iii).  
  18
Of particular interest is the fact that neither the Commission (in its initial 
assessment of the admissibility and merits of a case) nor the Court (in its 
capacity as final arbiter) has found it necessary to pronounce upon the extent to 
which the right to life guaranteed under Article 2 is applicable to the foetus. This 
gap will undoubtedly prove challenging should UK judges be faced with 
mooting the same point. The closest the Commission has come to discussing the 
issue is in two cases, Bruggemann and Scheuten v Federal Republic of Germany 
(1981) 3 EHRR 244 and Paton v United Kingdom (1981) 3 EHRR 408 where 
debate centred upon the right to respect for private and family life under Article 
8 as opposed to the right to life. In the former case a restriction on the law on 
abortion in Germany was found not to violate the right to respect for private life 
because it was decided that not every aspect of abortion related to privacy and 
therefore any regulation would not necessarily constitute an interference in a 
woman’s private life. In the  Paton case a husband’s claim that he should be 
consulted about his wife’s decision to have a termination was unsuccessful 
under Article 8. His attempt to prevent the termination did not succeed as the 
Commission found that the right to life and health of the mother limited any 
right that the foetus might have. The Commission did not, however, articulate 
specifically what those rights might be or the moment at which they begin to 
take effect.  
   
The European Court of Human Rights has rendered two decisions in cases 
pertaining to abortion – Open Door Counselling, Dublin Well Woman Centre 
Ltd and Others v Ireland (1993) 15 EHRR 244 and Bowman v United Kingdom 
(1998) 26 EHRR 1. It has been equally circumspect in its pronouncements again 
offering relatively little guidance for the national judges and leaving a degree of 
freedom for creative interpretation. Both cases in fact turned upon Article 10 of 
the Convention with its guarantee of a right to freedom of expression. The Open 
Door case, which concerned access to information about abortion services, was 
brought by two counselling organisations in Ireland which sought to challenge 
an injunction granted in the Irish courts restraining them from helping pregnant 
women to travel from Ireland in order to obtain abortions elsewhere. The Court 
found that there was indeed a violation of Article 10 because of the breadth of 
the injunction. The Irish government’s attempt to argue that Article 10 was not 
breached because the aim of Irish law was to protect the right to life of the 
unborn (as per Article 2 of the Convention) was unsuccessful as the Court held 
that, while there was no common standard of European morality and Ireland did 
have a degree of discretion, this d iscretion was subject nevertheless to the 
review of the Court. Because it was not an offence to seek an abortion outside of 
Ireland, the prohibition upon information was an improper restriction.   
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In the  Bowman case the issue was somewhat differently constituted but 
still brought within the umbrella of freedom of expression and as such largely 
decontexualised from questions of abortion politics. Mrs Bowman, a leading UK 
anti-choice activist, was prosecuted for distributing a large quantity of leaflets in 
election constituencies throughout Britain which set out the various candidates’ 
views on abortion and embryology  – the prosecution being brought under 
s.75(1) of the Representation of the People Act 1983 which prohibits any 
expenditure in excess of five pounds being incurred by any person other than 
candidates, their election agents and persons authorised in writing by the latter, 
with a view to promoting or procuring the election of a candidate. Although Mrs 
Bowman was eventually acquitted, this was on a technicality, due to her having 
been summonsed after the one year time limit for prosecution had passed. The 
European Court found that the prosecution amounted to a violation of the right 
to freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 10.  
 
The Bowman decision raises a number of important issues which go to the 
heart of what it means to live within a democratic society which seeks to balance 
the various rights and interests of its citizens and is telling about the way in 
which the Court constructs human  rights provisions sometimes without 
consideration of the full context of their operation.
32 For example, the issue is 
framed by the Court in terms of the promotion of democracy and electoral 
choice in which the leaflet produced by Mrs Bowman is represented as a means 
of providing the electorate with ‘factually accurate’ information as opposed to 
revealing the purpose of the leafleting strategy as an attempt to reposition 
abortion at the heart of electoral politics. The Court’s usage, without citation 
marks,  of the phrase ‘factually accurate’ to describe the information 
disseminated (in the context of the reported account of Bowman’s contention 
that there was no pressing social need to prevent the distribution of such 
information) implies that the accuracy of the information in the election leaflets 
should remain uncontested with the result that its capacity to actually enhance 
electoral choice (were it to have been revealed as misleading) was not discussed. 
Thus, it is apparently irrelevant that the leaflets contained language which could 
be described at best as highly emotive, if not simply inaccurate. Consider the 
following characterisation of the Labour candidate, Alison Mahon, described in 
the leaflet as:  
 
‘a leading pro-abortionist. As an MP she voted to  allow abortion up to birth for 
handicapped babies… She also voted to allow human embryos to be used as guinea-
pigs in programmes including the testing of drugs and other experiments.’  
 
                                                                 
32 See further S. Millns and S. Sheldon, ‘Delivering Democracy to Abortion Politics:  Bowman 
v The United Kingdom’ (1999) 7 Feminist Legal Studies 63.  
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The above representation of Ms Mahon’s position could, however, be 
paraphrased rather differently to provide a less misleading account. Consider, 
for example, the following hypothetical alternative: 
 
Ms Mahon is a leading pro-choice MP who voted to extend the provision of abortion 
services until term where two doctors believe that termination is necessary because of 
serious risk of grave foetal disability and who voted to allow human embryos to be 
used in approved and regulated scientific programmes including investigation into 
infertility and other diseases.   
 
The lack of contestation of the wording of Bowman’s leaflets is mirrored by a 
similar failure to analyse the accuracy of the imagery contained therein, notably 
the depiction of a free-floating foetus at ten weeks gestation.  Yet it has been 
argued persuasively by Petchesky that this type of imagery has the power to 
abstract and then to represent as fact an image which is inaccurate in that it 
obscures from view the body of the pregnant woman surrounding the foetus and 
negates her role in the gestation process.
33 Hence, the representation is one of 
the foetus as an autonomous individual, devoid of context and wholly 
disconnected from the woman supporting its development.  
 
The election leaflets are, therefore, loaded in a way which is not 
productive of accurate and informed debate on abortion politics and as such their 
ability to facilitate democratic choice seems to require some questioning in order 
to properly contextualise the dispute.  The Court preferred a classic (and 
decontextualised) formulation of the right to freedom of expression as being 
essentially negative in that the state was prevented from interfering in 
Bowman’s right in these circumstances. This exposes the troublesome 
consequence of an absence of positive obligation to ensure that information 
delivered into the public domain is accurate and that it is understood correctly 
by its audience in order to be conducive to the operation of a democratic society.  
 
Thus, within this line of case law it is evident that the reproductive issues 
in question are largely  decontextualised as they are sieved through a legal 
analysis and reduced to the bare legal bones of the right to freedom of 
expression. This lack of contextualisation at the European level is troubling 
because, as shown in the Bowman decision, it demonstrates an unwillingness to 
consider the reality in which rights provisions may bite and is a practice which it 
is feared the national judiciary may adopt, paying lip service to judicial 
precedent while avoiding the difficulties of interpretation demanded by a  
heightened sensitivity to context.  
                                                                 
33 R. Petchesky, ‘Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of Reproduction’ 
in M. Stanworth (ed.),  Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine 
(Polity, 1987) p.57.  
  21
That said, there is, at least, in the area of abortion a history, albeit limited, 
of case law to which the national judges should refer. But as pointed out above, 
preventing procreation is only one facet of the reproductive coin.  In the area of 
facilitation of parenthood there has been little activity beyond questions of 
national adoption provisions within the context of Article 12’s right to found a 
family (X v Belgium and the Netherlands Decisions & Reports 7 (1977)), this 
deficit being due probably to the length of time taken for disputes raised by the 
use of new reproductive technologies to reach the European Court.  
 
One instructive exception, however, is the decision of the European 
Commission in  X, Y and Z v  United Kingdom (Application no. 21830/93, 27 
June 1995) in which X, a female to male transsexual, whose long-term female 
partner, Y, became impregnated by artificial insemination using donor sperm 
and went on to give birth to Z, successfully established a violation of the right to 
respect for family life guaranteed by Article 8. The violation resulted, in the 
view of the Commission, from the failure of English law to give legal 
recognition to the de facto father-child relationship between X and Z. The 
Commission accepted a relatively expansive notion of ‘family life’ (as 
established through the use of new reproductive technologies) and refused to 
accept the assertion of the UK government that no family relationship existed 
between X and the other applicants and that Article 8 did not extend beyond the 
recognition of relationships of blood, marriage and adoption. Instead, the 
Commission maintained that in the UK, in the context of children born by 
artificial insemination by donor, it was accepted for the purposes of s.28(3) of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 that a ‘father’ need not be 
linked to a child either by blood or by marriage to its mother. Rather, according 
to the legislation, where a man who is not married to the mother is party to the 
treatment which results in the sperm of another being placed in the woman, he 
shall be deemed the ‘father’ of the child. The impossibility of a female to male 
transsexual (who remains of the female sex under English law) being considered 
the father of a child conceived through the lawful insemination by donor of his 
de facto partner, in the Commission’s view constituted an interference in the 
family life of the applicants.  
 
On its referral to the European Court of Human Rights ((1997) 24 EHRR 
143) the case was reconsidered whereupon it was agreed that the notion of 
family life did indeed encompass de facto relationships and that de facto family 
ties were identifiable between X, Y and Z. However, a shift in perspective was 
then operated by the Court to the extent that the novelty of reproductive 
technologies and the transsexuality of the applicant both became of central 
concern and a disagreement with the position of the Commission ensued. First, 
the Court noted that in its previous case law regarding de facto relationships 
these had only been found to exist with regard to biological parents and their  
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children and not to children conceived through new reproductive technologies. 
Secondly, it pointed out that there was no common European standard with 
regard to either the legal relationship between a child conceived through use of 
reproductive technologies and the person who performs the role of that child’s 
father, nor moreover, with respect to the granting of parental rights to 
transsexuals. The combination of the newness of the technologies together with 
the transsexuality of the applicant produced an exotic cocktail which, in the 
view of the Court, gave rise to no common response among signatory states, 
meaning that each state should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in dealing 
with such matters. The UK had not surpassed this margin. Hence there was no 
failure to respect family life and no obligation on the part of the UK to recognise 
legally the relationships existing between X and Z. 
        
The case of X,Y and Z, thus, provides an illustration of the Commission’s 
fairly liberal, and Court’s more restrictive, approach to the construction of 
‘family life’ for the purposes of Article 8, especially with regard to its 
application beyond biological and blood ties and to transgendered persons. Such 
interpretations will be important  - but undoubtedly confusing  - to the national 
judiciary in these relatively uncharted waters as and when disputes concerning 
would-be parents arise before the domestic courts.  
 
On balance, it is apparent that the interpretation of the Commission and 
Court in reproductive matters has not been extensive. It offers some guidance to 
the national judiciary (not least in terms of strategies to be adopted in order to 
side-step the ethical, moral and political overtones of such issues), but not a 
great deal besides, particularly as regard the fundamental question of what 
amounts to ‘life’ in the context of the foetus and embryo. How, then, will the 
fundamental rights under the Convention translate into the national context with 
its new rights culture? How compatible is UK law with the provisions of the 
Convention as interpreted in the cases outlined above? Furthermore, what might 
one expect the national judges to do when required to relieve moments of 
tension through the process of domestication of Convention rights? 
 




One of the key pieces of British legislation which might require judicial 
interpretation for its human rights compliance is the Abortion Act 1967. The 
Abortion Act, while not creating a right for a woman to have a termination, sets 
out in s.1(1) the time-limit and conditions under which abortion is lawful. This 
is 24 weeks in cases where continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, 
greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, or where continuance would  
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involve injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any 
existing children of her family (s.1(1)(a)). The time-limit can be extended (up to 
birth) where termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the 
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman (s.1(1)(b)), where continuance 
of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman greater 
than if the pregnancy were terminated (s.1(1)(c)), or where there is a substantial 
risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped (s.1(1)(d)). Section 1(1) of the 
Abortion Act also makes access to abortion subject to the agreement of two 
registered medical practitioners.  
 
i) Approval by two medical practitioners 
Taking the latter provision first, the requirement that a woman’s decision to 
terminate a pregnancy should be approved by two registered medical 
practitioners m ay constitute a violation of that woman’s Convention rights, 
notably the right under Article 8 to respect for her private life. This is because 
the orientation of the requirement is quite clearly to underscore the fact that the 
decision to abort does not b elong to the woman alone and that external 
confirmation is necessary of the impact of continuance of the pregnancy on her 
physical or mental health and upon that of any children she may already have. It 
has been argued by Emily Jackson in the context of domestic British health care 
law that the requirement of medical approval sits uncomfortably with existing 
legal principles, notably that of patient self-determination and the commitment 
to autonomy.
34 Furthermore Jackson expresses the concern that a woman’s 
motives for seeking a termination might be increasingly scrutinised for their 
moral legitimacy in an age were prenatal tests allow for the diagnosis of foetal 
disability with abortion being potentially made more restrictive in response to 
what might be seen as women’s cavalier use of abortion for trivial reasons.
35 It is 
evident, that while neither social rights with respect to health care, nor general 
principles such as patient autonomy and self-determination feature in the 
Convention, any claim made with regard to the fundamental rights violations at 
stake here could be positioned quite squarely within the right to respect for 
private life along the lines of the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v 
Wade (1973) 410 US. The right to private life is, of course, not absolute and not 
every interference therein amounts to a violation of privacy especially, for 
example, when the state must look also to the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others as indicated by the European Commission in the 
Bruggemann case. It might nonetheless be sustained that the interference in the 
right to private life, implied by a blanket requirement that at even the earliest 
stages of pregnancy a woman must submit her wish to terminate to the 
                                                                 
34 E. Jackson, ‘Abortion, Autonomy and Prenatal Diagnosis’ (2000) 9  Social and Legal 
Studies 467. 
35 Ibid., at 479-487.  
  24
authorisation of medical personnel, is on balance disproportionate and therefore 
unlawful.   
   
ii)  Time limits 
Converse to the above pro-choice interpretation of the incompatibility of s.1(1) 
with the Convention, it is not unimaginable that the time limit for abortion, 
particularly in cases where abortion beyond the 24 week period is permitted (and 
thus the foetus is potentially viable) might be challenged as too high by anti-
choice groups basing their claim under Article 2’s right to life provision. This 
would suggest a need for judicial clarification of the ambit of the concept of a 
‘life’ capable of being protected under the Convention. While under domestic 
law a foetus has never been recognised as a legal person, and hence does not 
have any legal rights until birth (Re F (in utero) [1988] 2 All ER 193), there has 
been an indication by the judiciary that a foetus is not completely without legal 
interests (see, for example, the case of Re S [1992] 3 WLR 806, in which the 
High Court gave a declaration that it was lawful to perform a caesarean section 
upon a pregnant woman despite her refusal to consent to the operation). It is not 
necessarily the case that what amounts to a ‘life’ for the purposes of the 
Convention and what amounts to a ‘legal person’ for the purposes of domestic 
law are one  and the same, with the former going potentially to the question of 
viability. Should this interpretation be preferred to one based upon the fact of 
birth, then it is worth remembering that under Article 2 of the Convention there 
is little possibility for the state to justify an interference in the right to life. The 
right is virtually absolute with no question of balancing it against the rights or 
interests of another individual such as the pregnant woman.  
 
iii)   Disability discrimination 
Probably the most vulnerable aspect of s.1(1) of the Abortion Act as regards its 
human rights compatibility is subsection (d) which permits terminations to term 
in the case of serious foetal handicap. This vulnerability lies in the fact that the 
provision might be argued t o be in violation not only of the right to life 
provision contained within Article 2 of the Convention, but also might be 
considered a form of discrimination against disabled people and thus in violation 
of Article 14. Although disability is not a specified category under Article 14 
discrimination under this heading could be invoked under the auspices of 
disability being another ‘status’ demanding equal protection in accordance with 
the widely drafted, final phrase of this Article.  
 
Because, as mentioned a bove, the foetus lacks legal personality in UK 
law, it would be difficult to argue that it is disabled foetuses themselves which 
are the ‘victims’ of this form of discrimination either vis-à-vis the non-disabled 
or vis-à-vis those who become disabled through accident or illness after birth. It 
might, however, be more persuasively sustained that the termination of  
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abnormal foetuses constitutes discrimination against existing disabled persons.
36 
This is because it perpetuates a negative view of disability (which is seen as 
something to be eradicated) and because it operates to reduce the number of 
disabled people in society thus diminishing the number of positive role models 
available to the disabled leaving them isolated and with an impoverished 
community.    
 
While the European Court of Human Rights has traditionally been rather 
cautious in its usage of Article 14, in that, having once found a violation of a 
substantive right under the Convention, further pronouncement upon that right 
taken in conjunction with Article 14 has been deemed unnecessary ( Airey v 
Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305, at p.318, para.30; see also Dudgeon v  United 
Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149), it is not clear to what extent UK judges will be 
able to resist a deeper consideration of the relevance and meaning of Article 14. 
This is because, first, the terrain of discrimination law is extremely familiar to 
the UK courts which have for the past 25 years been used to dealing with 
discrimination claims based notably upon grounds of sex (under the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975), race (Race Relations Act 1976) and disability 
(Disability Discrimination Act 1995).  For the sake of legal coherency and 
stability, it is likely that a semblance of similarity in interpretation will be sought 
between notions of discrimination under national provisions and that contained 
within Article 14 (albeit that the sectors to which the national provisions apply – 
primarily employment, education and services  - are more limited than the 
potential spheres of influence of Convention r ights). Secondly, the Council of 
Europe’s proposed new Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, introducing a free-
standing anti-discrimination provision with regard to any legal right currently 
recognised in domestic or international law, suggests a general acknowledgment 
that the present ambit of Article 14 is inadequate. Thus, any move by the UK 
judiciary to give a broader interpretation to Article 14 would be in line with 
recognition of this deficiency and would demonstrate a deeper commitment 
towards equality and non-discrimination.  
 
iv)   Putative fathers  
A fourth type of claim to assert reproductive rights challenging the compatibility 
of the Abortion Act with the Convention may also be envisaged given previous 
history of disputes in this area in which putative fathers have brought actions in 
order to prevent their female partners from having a termination (as in Paton v 
Trustees of British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1978] 2 All ER 987 and C v S 
[1987] 1 All ER 1230). Litigants bringing similar action in f uture may seek to 
rely on Article 8’s guarantee of a right to respect for family life. They might also 
invoke the right under Article 12 to marry and to found a family  – it having 
                                                                 
36 This argument is run, but eventually rejected, by L. Gillan, ‘Prenatal Diagnosis and 
Discrimination Against the Disabled’ (1999) 25 Journal of Medical Ethics 163.  
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already been left open by the European Commission that these two components 
are separable (X v Belgium and the Netherlands Decisions & Reports 7 (1977) 
p.75).
37 It would not matter, therefore, if the couple were unmarried (as was the 
case in C v S) thus extending the number of potential litigants considerably.  
 
Here, however, one  might envisage a lesser degree of success for the 
litigant. This is because the claims of putative fathers might be stemmed by 
invoking the second paragraph of Article 8 and the necessity in a democratic 
society to protect the rights of others which in this case would be those of the 
pregnant woman (as already determined by the Commission in the Paton case). 
Furthermore, the fate of any claim made under Article 12 would be linked to 
that made under Article 8 since Article 12 explicitly permits restrictions on the 
right to marry and found family in accordance with national law. Given that in 
Paton v  Trustees of British Pregnancy Advisory Service and  C v  S it was 
decided that putative fathers have no rights under the Abortion Act to intervene 
in the decision t o terminate a pregnancy, acting either in their own right or on 
behalf of the foetus, it would only be in the event that this determination is 
reviewed and overruled, meaning that an unjustified interference in the putative 
father’s right to family life is judged to have taken place and therefore national 
law is invalidated because contrary to Article 8, that a claim under Article 12 
might also stand a chance of success. 
 
v)  Conscientious or religious objection 
A further aspect of the Abortion Act which might prove vulnerable to claims of 
a human rights violation is s.4. This section states that ‘…no person shall be 
under any duty whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal 
requirement, to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he 
has a conscientious objection …’, with a limitation upon the right to object 
being imposed in an emergency situation. The conscientious objection clause 
has been interpreted in the domestic courts to encompass those people who 
actually physically participate in an abortion, such as doctors and nurses (Royal 
College of Nursing v Department of Health [1981] 1 All ER 545) but not those 
ancillary personnel who are indirectly associated with the procedure, such as a 
secretary who refuses to type a letter r ecommending an abortion ( Janaway  v 
Salford Health Authority [1988] 3 All ER 1079). 
 
The compatibility of this interpretation of s.4 with the Convention can be 
viewed in two distinct ways, both of which turn upon its compliance with 
Article 9 which guarantees that ‘[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion…’. On the one hand, it has been argued that the right to 
abortion objection in s.4 is too restrictive and, thus, contrary to Article 9 in that 
                                                                 
37 See discussion on this interpretation in P. van Dijk and G.J.H. van Hoof,  Theory and 
Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 2
nd ed., (Kluwer, 1990), p.448.  
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it excludes ancillary personnel  whose beliefs might lead them to object to 
participating in an abortion, such as those workers required to clean medical 
instruments used in an abortion or to dispose of foetal tissue.
38 This view is 
based upon the premise that for the objector there is no real difference between 
physical participation in the termination and assistance given at other stages 
either prior to, or post, the abortion. Both amount to acting in a way which is 
contrary to a belief that abortion is wrong.  
 
On the other hand, it might be asserted that s.4 is not incompatible with 
Article 9 because of the possibility of restricting the right contained therein in 
accordance with the Article’s second paragraph in order to protect public health 
and to safeguard the rights and freedoms of  others, namely those of women 
seeking a termination who would otherwise run up against a refusal by doctors 
or nurses to either refer them for a termination or to perform one. The provision 
for disallowing the right to object in an emergency does not necessarily 
adequately secure protection because, while many women may not present 
themselves as emergency cases whose lives are threatened should a termination 
be refused, there may be instances in which particularly a failure to refer causes 
delay and the possibility that the legal time-limit for the termination is 
surpassed. Evidently the current position represents a finely-tuned balance 
between the individual right of the objector and the social costs (and costs to 
individual women) of the objection. As in the case of claims made by putative 
fathers discussed above, it is certainly not beyond doubt that the balance 
between competing rights and interests as currently configured should be revised 
in future to take account of shifts in judicial and social attitudes towards 
termination provision.   
 
vi)   Northern Ireland      
While, with the exception of (i) above, the examples discussed so far 
contemplate the possibility that the Abortion Act may be judged non-compliant 
with human rights provisions because of its undue liberality in permitting 
women to exercise reproductive choices, the reverse scenario presents itself in 
the context of Northern Ireland where, unlike the rest of the UK, the Abortion 
Act does not apply. Instead, the guide-lines given in the common law authority 
of R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687 are still in operation and these broadly restrict 
the availability of abortion to situations in which it is necessary to save the 
woman’s life. Using Convention rights one might imagine an intervention by 
representatives of the pro-choice lobby in Northern Ireland arguing that this 
position represents a violation of Article 8 and a woman’s right to respect for 
private life. Of course one would expect the counter argument to be posed that 
                                                                 
38 L. Hammer, ‘Abortion Objection in the United Kingdom Within the Framework of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ [1999]  European 
Human Rights Law Review 564.  
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this legal situation is n ecessary in order to give due respect to the prevailing 
moral climate in Northern Ireland (as was advanced in the Open Door case by 
the Irish government). However, the European Court of Human Rights is only 
willing to push the margin of appreciation allowed to each state in defence of its 
particular moral concerns so far. It might, therefore, be decided by the UK 
judiciary that the current situation in Northern Ireland, given the relative liberal 
access to abortion throughout the rest of Europe, is overly restrictive and that on 
balance it does, indeed, interfere with the respect due to private life. Such a view 
would not be untenable, moreover, given that the European Court has already 
determined that the maintenance in Northern Ireland of criminal sanctions for 
male homosexual activity when similar acts had been decriminalised in the rest 
of the United Kingdom (in line with a European wide movement towards 
decriminalisation) could not be sustained on the basis that the moral and 
religious particularities of Northern Ireland demanded a more restrictive stance 
towards male homosexuality (Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149).   
 
It is, finally, worth remembering that the determination of the many and 
varied human rights questions raised by the Abortion Act is rendered especially 
difficult under UK law for two principal reasons. One is the historic, and 
controversial, absence in national law of any ‘right to privacy’. The want of a 
positive right in this regard has led to some of the components of privacy being 
judicially interpreted to fall within various other aspects of the law on civil 
liberties such as autonomy, secrecy and dignity.
39  Articulating a specific and 
new right to respect for private life in the light of the long-standing judicial 
development of existing legal concepts will require careful thought and skilful 
handling, not only to achieve a reconciliation with the past but also because, 
prospectively, the notion of ‘private life’ is an empty vessel which may be filled 
with a huge variety of different subject matters. Hence, a judicial decision taken 
with respect to its interpretation in any one particular sphere (abortion, for 
example) may be used as a precedent in many other cases beyond the field of 
reproductive rights.  
  
A second difficulty is raised by the requirement that the judges carry out a 
‘proportionality’ test in order to assess whether the interference in the enjoyment 
of the right to private life (or to the assertion of one’s beliefs as in the case of 
conscientious objection, or to freedom of expression) is proportionate to the aim 
pursued by the state in creating the interference (such as, for example, the 
protection of health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others) and is, 
therefore, justifiable. This type of balancing exercise is something which UK 
judges are unused to undertaking as the formulation of similar tests in judicial 
review applications under national law would be to frame the question in terms 
                                                                 
39 D. Feldman, ‘Secrecy, Dignity, or Autonomy? Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty’ (1994) 
47 Current Legal Problems 41.  
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of the ‘reasonableness’ of the measure. The outcome would then involve 
ascertaining whether or not the measure was so unreasonable that no reasonable 
authority could possibly have taken it (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd 
v  Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). Evidently the two tests require 
very different evaluative exercises to be carried out  – with the test under 
national law being much more generous to the position adopted by public 
authorities vis-à-vis individuals than that under European law. 
 
B. New Reproductive Technologies 
 
It is not only in the area of abortion, but also that of assisted reproduction that 
one might imagine a number of challenges being made to domestic legislation.  
 
i)   Access criteria 
One prime target for a challenge as to its Convention compliance is s.13(5) of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 in which it is stipulated that 
in determining who should have access to new reproductive technologies 
decision-makers should give due regard to the welfare of any resultant child and 
in particular the needs of that child for a father. Research carried out with 
respect to the provision of reproductive technology treatment services under the 
National Health Service has demonstrated that certain women are more likely to 
be refused access to these services because of a particular aspect of their status 
or life-style and also that there is a marked lack of coherency between health 
authorities as to criteria for access.
40 Already under national law a decision to 
refuse IVF treatment services to a woman aged 37 on the grounds that she was 
over the age limit fixed at 35 has been challenged in judicial review proceedings 
in the UK courts ( R v Sheffield Health Authority, ex parte Seale, 17 October 
1994). Although the litigant was unsuccessful  - the judge finding that the policy 
on age was neither irrational nor unreasonable because clinical findings 
indicated that treatment over the age of 35 was less effective – the case provides 
an important template for litigation once the provisions of the HRA take effect. 
This is because, prospectively, it might be argued by women refused access to 
treatment services because of their status or life-style (not just older women but 
also, for example, disabled women, single women or those in a lesbian 
relationship), that the stipulation in s.13(5) amounts to d iscrimination. This 
argument could be made by focusing upon the guarantee under Article 8 of a 
right to respect for private and family life, and could be used in conjunction with 
Article 14’s prohibition on discrimination which includes specifically 
discrimination based upon sex and might be interpreted also to include 
discrimination on the grounds of age, sexuality and disability as any one of these 
                                                                 
40 A. Plomer, I. Smith and N. Martin-Clement, ‘Rationing Policies on Access to  In Vitro 
Fertilisation in the National Health Service, UK’, Reproductive Health Matters (1999).  
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may potentially constitute an ‘other status’ demanding protection against 
discrimination.  
 
ii)   Information 
Beyond the question of access to new reproductive technologies, further 
questions under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 might arise 
regarding access to information by children born of donor insemination. 
Currently donors remain anonymous a nd are not legally entitled to, or obliged 
by, parental responsibility over any resulting child, nor can disclosure of the 
identity of the biological parent be required (s.31(5)) . But might not it be 
envisaged that the children of the reproductive revolution who begin to seek 
answers to questions about their biological origin and identity should make a 
claim that current provisions about access to information are unlawful because 
contrary to the right to freedom of expression contained within Article 10? Such 
a claim might be given added weight when considered alongside the not wholly 
dissimilar situation of adopted children who have the right to trace their 
biological parents. Indeed, it has already been reported in the press that the 
Department of Health  is considering the creation of a register containing 
information on donors in order to allow children born from anonymous 
donations to trace their genetic origins.
41 
 
It was noted above that in the  Open Door case Article 10 was held to 
cover the dissemination of information within the context of abortion services. 
However, the question is rather differently framed in the context of donor 
information because in this case individuals are claiming a right to  receive 
information from a public body, as opposed to, in the Irish case, the censoring of 
the  provision of information by  non-state actors. Clearly the former situation 
would seem to be more delicate than the latter – not least because of the need to 
respect the rights of donors themselves. It would remain to be seen, therefore, 
whether in this extremely sensitive area, the second paragraph of Article 10 with 
its requirement to pay heed to the rights of others (that is donors) would take 
precedence. In practical terms, too, any threat to release information  about 
donors, or indeed to attribute them with a degree of parental responsibility for a 
child born as a result of the use of their sperm or egg, would lead to a marked 
reduction in the number of donors. Thus the legal question of the legitimacy of 
limitations upon access to information cannot be divorced from wider 
considerations of public policy which must surely be at the back (if not the 
front) of the minds of the judiciary in balancing the interests of donors and 
children seeking access to information about their origins. 
 
                                                                 
41 A. Gillam, ‘Register Plan for Donor Births’ (25 April, 2000) The Guardian.   
  31
3. THE INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW   
 
At the risk of overcomplicating matters, but in order to avoid a partial view, 
there is a further legal factor at play which must be considered in any discourse 
on human rights protection at  national and European levels  – the law of the 
European Union (EU).
42 There is a complex relationship between national law, 
Convention rights and EU law – one which has evolved gradually over time, but 
which has become increasingly important since reference to the Convention was 
made by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case of Rutili v Minister for 
the Interior C-36/75 [1975] ECR II-1219, and since the inclusion in the Treaty 
on European Union (the ‘Maastricht’ Treaty 1992) of a reference to the 
Convention as a source of human rights principles to be respected by the EU. 
The relationship has been strengthened further by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1997) which shores up the human rights framework of the EU making 
adherence to the human rights principles contained within the Convention and 
EU law a condition of membership of the Union and providing sanctions for use 
against any offending member state. Moreover, the human rights dynamic is set 
to flourish with the introduction of a Charter of Fundamental Rights into the EU 
legal order.
43 Importantly, however, EU law, unlike the European Convention on 
Human Rights, has always been incorporated into domestic law as a result of the 
European Communities Act 1972 with the UK courts having now accepted its 
supremacy over national law ( R v  Secretary of State for Transport ex parte 
Factortame (no.2) [1991] 1 All ER 70). What to make, therefore, of a potential 
clash between EU law, Convention rights and national provisions should all 
three be found to apply in a particular factual circumstance? 
 
Relevant for present purposes is the fact that EU law has been evoked 
already in several cases in the areas of both assisted reproduction and abortion. 
That said, however, the construction of these issues in terms of fundamental 
rights has been strongly resisted by both the ECJ and national courts. Instead 
reproductive matters have been located amongst the provisions on the four 
freedoms of movement of goods, persons, services and capital. More 
specifically access to abortion facilities and to fertility treatments in another 
member state have been dealt with under the remit of ‘services’ with regard to 
which the ECJ has held that the free movement principles include not only their 
provision but also their receipt, and which substantively have been interpreted to 
include medical services (Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro C-286/82, 
C-26/83 [1984] ECR I -377;  Kohll v  Union des Caisses de Maladie C-158/96 
[1998] ECR I-1931). With respect to abortion, its construction as a service was 
                                                                 
42 See P. Alston and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘An “Ever Closer Union” in Need of a Human Rights 
Policy: The European Union and Human Rights’ in P. Alston (ed.),  The EU and Human 
Rights (OUP, 1999) p.3.  
43 EC OJ 2000, C 364/8.  
  32
determined by the ECJ in SPUC (Ireland) v Grogan C-159/90 [1991] ECR I-
4685, a further case dealing with the provision of information about termination 
facilities. As for fertility treatments it was the English Court of Appeal which 
decided, in the case of Diane Blood (who, having been refused permission for 
treatment in the UK, sought to export her dead husband’s sperm to Belgium 
where insemination was lawful under Belgian law), that fertility treatment 
services came within the purview of EU law ( R v   Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority, ex p Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687). Consequently a 
member state may not prevent the movement of individuals to another member 
state to receive access to such services.  
 
It is clear that the construction of these issues in EU law is different from 
that under the European Convention on Human Rights. This is because the 
former is fundamentally grounded upon the  economic nature of the service 
provision.
44 Thus, having found that abortion was indeed a service covered by 
EU law, the ECJ in the  Grogan decision went on to find that there was no 
interference in the freedom to provide this service because there was no 
economic link between the provision of the service by the abortion clinics in 
Britain and the distribution of the information by the Students Union in Dublin.  
This conceptual framework is not unproblematic for a number of reasons.  
 
First, with respect to EU law itself, the reduction of human rights issues to 
purely economic, internal market arguments can be disconcerting. This is 
because such a formulation appears to trivialise the fundamental nature of the 
rights at stake paying little heed to the way in which these particular rights may 
go to the heart of member states’ constitutions and conceptions of the nation (as 
is clearly the case with abortion in Ireland).
45 In this respect the potential 
significance of the new EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is deceptively 
limited.  
 
On the one hand, the Charter appears as a dynamic and innovative text 
which, with a distinct basis apart from the treaties, operates a conceptual 
decoupling of fundamental rights from the largely economic rights contained in 
the pre-existing legislation. Furthermore, in terms of the material substance of 
the rights contained within the Charter, this extends far wider than the existing 
scope of rights within EU law. Taking, for example, the first three rights set out 
                                                                 
44 See L. Flynn, ‘The Body Politic(s) of EC Law’ in T. Hervey and D. O’Keeffe (eds.), Sex 
Equality in the European Union (John Wiley, 1996)  p.301; T. Hervey, ‘Buy Baby: The 
European U nion and Regulation of Human Reproduction’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 207. 
45 D.R. Phelan, ‘Right to Life of the Unborn v. Promotion of Trade in Services: The European 
Court of Justice and the Normative Shaping of the European Union’ (1992) 55 Modern Law 
Review 670.  
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in the Charter, it is apparent that all of them might contribute to legal 
developments in the domain of human reproduction. Hence, the first article of 
the Charter, which asserts that human dignity is inviolable and as such must be 
respected and protected, provides a key underlying value with regard to which 
all claims to reproductive rights and freedoms should be judged. The second and 
third articles offer an interesting combination of classic and innovative rights, 
the former guaranteeing the right to life while the third expressly addresses the 
advent of new technologies by proclaiming a right to physical and mental 
integrity and requiring that in the fields of medicine and biology free and 
informed consent must be respected and eugenic practices (such as the selection 
of persons), using the human body and its parts in order to obtain financial gain 
and reproductive cloning of humans should be prohibited. In this respect it 
seems that the conceptualisation of fundamental rights contained within the 
Charter goes well beyond the strict service based approach set out in Grogan 
and Blood.  
 
On the other hand, however, the Charter is n ot legally binding, having 
been merely ‘solemnly proclaimed’ by the European Council in Nice in 
December 2000. Furthermore, even should it one day become binding in law 
(which in itself is far from evident) its scope is restricted to the actions of 
institutions and bodies of the EU and to member states when implementing EU 
law.
46 It is regrettable, therefore, that the Charter and any EU human rights 
policy developed with respect to it, will be inseparable from the overall market 
dynamic of the Union.  
 
Secondly, and not unconnected to the distinct legal approaches adopted 
under EU law and the Convention, there is a degree of apparent tension between 
the Grogan decision of the ECJ and the Open Door decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights. In the latter  the restriction on the provision of 
information by counselling groups was unlawful amounting to a violation of the 
Convention, while in the former a similar restriction was deemed outside the 
scope of EU law because of an insufficient economic link with the service 
provision. Tension arises because the construction of the provision of abortion 
services as an economic matter is vastly different from the construction of 
access to information about such services as a matter of fundamental human 
rights. So, faced with not only conflicts between national and European 
provisions but also conflicting conceptualisations of Convention rights and EU 
law, the national judges will have no easy time trying to realise a solution which 
respects not only the claims to supremacy of European laws over national law 
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The challenge for the future, therefore, is set and it is indeed complex. 
The one certainty is that there can b e no return to the old regime of rights 
protection in the UK. Even those who are sceptical of the benefits of using rights 
based arguments as a strategy in seeking redress for discrimination, inequalities 
and social and political wrongful acts cannot but a ccept the ineluctability of 
rights discourse in a legal world now so heavily saturated by talk of fundamental 
rights, as exemplified by the enactment of the HRA. Like it or not, rights claims 
will henceforth form a staple part of litigation and it is, therefore, to their 
interpretation in a progressive and inclusive manner that attention should be 
addressed.     
 
Interpretation remains the prerogative of the judiciary. Having previously 
been required to act in a climate which saw precious little formulation of any 
positive rights claims at all, the national judges are now required to determine 
complex questions about the interrelationship between the newly domesticated 
Convention, the formerly uniquely supreme law of the EU, and long-standing 
democratically  enacted national legislation. All this in areas such as human 
reproduction which require infinitely sensitive handling and which are also 
continuously in a state of technological evolution to which law (at whatever 
level and in whatever form) must adapt.  It remains to be seen whether the UK 
judiciary are inclined to see the construction of reproductive matters as 
pertaining to first generation fundamental civil and political rights or second 
generation socio-economic rights when these matters are debated i n the post 
rights revolution era. What is evident, however, is that the focus will be on their 
formulation in terms of ‘legal’ rights meaning that their content cannot be 
automatically equated with any moral and political claims made in relation to 
reproductive issues. That said, law, morality and politics are bound inextricably 
together in their ability to regulate society and all are required to adjust as times 
and attitudes change. To this end a revolutionary shift in judicial thinking about 
human rights is in order – one which tends towards the production of a discourse 
on human rights which is international in outlook while remaining acutely aware 
of the domestic contexts in which important moral and political choices about 
reproduction are made. 
                                                                 
47 It is suspected that a degree of tension will persist between interpretations of the 
Convention by the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights because of the specific 
remit of EU law. This is despite the worthy declaration in Article 52(3) of the EU Charter that 
‘[i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,  the meaning and 




Alston, P. and Weiler, J.H.H., ‘An “Ever Closer Union” in Need of a Human 
Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights’ in Alston, P. (ed.), The 
EU and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 1999) p.3.  
 
Bennion, F., ‘What Interpretation is "Possible" under Section 3(1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998?’ [2000] Public Law 77. 
 
Bottomley, A. (ed.), Feminist Perspectives on the Foundational Subjects of Law 
(London: Cavendish Publishing, 1996). 
 
Bottomley, A. and Conaghan J. (eds.),  Feminist Theory and Legal Strategy 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 
 
Bridgeman, J. and Millns, S., Feminist Perspectives on Law: Law’s Engagement 
with the Female Body (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998).  
 
Clements, L. and Young J., ‘Human Rights: Changing the Culture’ (1999) 26 
Journal of Law and Society 1. 
 
Conaghan, J., ‘Gendered Harms and the Law of Tort: Remedying (Sexual) 
Harassment’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 407.  
 
Devlin, P., The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: OUP, 1968). 
 
Dworkin, R., Life's Dominion - An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia 
(London: Harper Collins, 1993). 
 
Ewing, K.D., ‘The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy’ (1998) 62 
Modern Law Review 79. 
 
Ewing, K.D., ‘Social Rights and Constitutional Law’ [1999] Public Law 104. 
 
Feldman, D., ‘Secrecy, D ignity, or Autonomy? Views of Privacy as a Civil 
Liberty’ (1994) 47 Current Legal Problems 41. 
 
Feldman, D., ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and Constitutional Principles’ 
(1999) 19 Legal Studies 165. 
 
Flynn, L., ‘The Body Politic(s) of EC Law’ in Hervey, T. and O’Keeffe, D. 
(eds.),  Sex Equality in the European Union (Chichester: John Wiley, 1996) 
p.301.   
  36
 
Gearty, C.A. (ed.), European Civil Liberties and the European Convention on 
Human Rights: A Comparative Study (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1997). 
 
Gillam, A., ‘Register Plan for Donor Births’ (25 April, 2000) The Guardian.  
 
Gillan, L., ‘Prenatal Diagnosis and Discrimination Against the Disabled’ (1999) 
25 Journal of Medical Ethics 163. 
 
Greycar R. and Morgan, J.,  The Hidden Gender of Law  (Annadale: The 
Federation Press, 1990). 
 
Griffith, J.A.G., The Politics of the Judiciary (London: Fontana Press, 1997). 
 
Hammer, L., ‘Abortion Objection in the United Kingdom Within the Framework 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ 
[1999] European Human Rights Law Review 564. 
 
Hart, H.L.A., Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford: OUP, 1968). 
 
Harvey, C., ‘Governing after the Rights Revolution’ (2000) 27 Journal of Law 
and Society 61.  
 
Hazell, R., ‘Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State Survive?’ [1999] Public 
Law 84. 
 
Herman, D.,  Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Equality 
(Toronto: Toronto UP, 1994). 
 
Hervey, T., ‘Buy Baby: The European Union and Regulation of Human 
Reproduction’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 207. 
 
Humm, M.,  Feminisms: A Reader  (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1992). 
 
Hunt, M., ‘The "Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act’ [1998]  Public 
Law 423. 
 
Hunt, M., Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
1998).  
 
Hunt, M., ‘ The Human Rights Act and Legal Culture: The Judiciary and the 
Legal Profession’ (1999) 26 Journal of Law and Society 86.  
  37
 
Institute of Public Policy Research, The Constitution of the United Kingdom 
(London: IPPR, 1991). 
 
Jackson, E., ‘Abortion, Autonomy and Prenatal Diagnosis’ (2000) 9 Social and 
Legal Studies 467. 
 
Jagger, A.M., Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Brighton: Harvester, 1983).  
 
Kemp, S. and Squires, J., Feminisms (Oxford: OUP, 1997). 
 
Kingdom, E., What’s Wrong with Rights: Problems for Feminist Politics of Law 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991). 
 
Kingdom, E., ‘Body Politics and Rights’ in Bridgeman, J. and Millns, S. (eds.), 
Law and Body Politics: Regulating the Female Body (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1995) p.1.   
 
Klug, F., ‘The Human Rights Act 1998, Pepper v. Hart and All That’ [1999] 
Public Law 246. 
 
Lacey, N., Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998).  
 
Lester, A., ‘Fundamental Rights: The United Kingdom Isolated’ [1984] Public 
Law 46. 
 
Liberty, A People's Charter: Liberty's Bill of Rights (London: Liberty, 1991). 
 
Loux, A. and Finnie W. (eds.), Human Rights and Scots Law – Comparative 
Perspectives on the Incorporation of the ECHR (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000). 
 
MacKinnon, C.A., Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1987). 
 
McColgan, A., Women Under the Law: The False Promise of Human Rights 
(Harlow: Pearson, 2000). 
 
McGlynn, C.,  The Woman Lawyer: Making the Difference  (London: 
Butterworths, 1998). 
 
Millns, S. and Sheldon, S., ‘Delivering Democracy to Abortion Politics: 
Bowman v The United Kingdom’ (1999) 7 Feminist Legal Studies 63.  
  38
 
Moon, G., ‘The Draft Discrimination Protocol to the European Convention on 
Human Rights: A Progress Report’ [2000] European Human Rights Law Review 
49. 
 
Morris, A. and Nott, S.,  Working Women and the Law: Equality and 
Discrimination in Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 1991). 
 
Mowbray, A.R., ‘The Composition and Operation of the New European Court 
of Human Rights’ [1999] Public Law 219. 
 
Murphy, T. and Whitty, N., ‘What is a Fair Trial? Rape Prosecutions, Disclosure 
and the Human Rights Act’ (2000) 8 Feminist Legal Studies 143.  
 
Naffine, N., Law and the Sexes (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990). 
 
O’Donovan, K.,  Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1985). 
 
Oliver, D., ‘The Frontiers of the State: Public Authorities and Public Functions 
under the Human Rights Act’ [2000] Public Law 476. 
 
Palmer, A., ‘Critical Perspectives on Women’s Rights: The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ in Bottomley, A. 
(ed.),  Feminist Perspectives on the Foundational Subjects of Law (London: 
Cavendish Publishing, 1996) p.223. 
 
Petchesky, R., ‘Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of 
Reproduction’ in Stanworth, M. (ed.),  Reproductive Technologies: Gender, 
Motherhood and Medicine (Cambridge: Polity, 1987) p.57. 
 
Phelan, D.R., ‘Right to Life of the Unborn v. Promotion of Trade in Services: 
The European Court of Justice and the Normative Shaping of the European 
Union’ (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 670. 
 
Plomer, A., Smith, I. and Martin-Clement, N., ‘Rationing Policies on Access to 
In Vitro Fertilisation in the National Health Service, UK’, Reproductive Health 
Matters (1999). 
 
Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm 3782, 1997.  
 
Sachs, A. and Wilson, J.H., Sexism and the Law: A Study of Male Beliefs and 
Legal Bias in Britain and the United States (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978).  
  39
 
Sheldon, S., ‘Subject Only to the Attitude of the Surgeon C oncerned: The 
Judicial Protection of Medical Discretion’ (1996) 5 Social and Legal Studies 95. 
 
Smart, C., Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989).   
 
Stychin, C., A Nation by Rights: National Cultures, Sexual Identity Politics and 
the Discourse of Rights (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1998).  
 
Tong, R., Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Unwin 
Hyam, 1989). 
 
Van Dijk, P. and Van Hoof, J.G.H.,  Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 2
nd ed., (Deventer: Kluwer, 1990). 
 
Wadham, J., ‘Bringing Rights Home: Labour's Plans to Incorporate the 
European Convention on Human Rights into UK Law’ [1997] Public Law 75. 
 
Wadham, J. and Mountfield, H., Blackstone's Guide to the Human Rights Act 
1998 (London: Blackstone Press, 1999). 
 
Walker, N., ‘Setting English Judges to Rights’ (1999) 19  Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 133. 
 
Zander, M., A Bill of Rights 4
th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997).  
 
 
 
 